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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

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15 NOVEMBER 1972
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 6 - 12 NOVEMBER 1972

Moscow (2480 items)

October Revolution Anniversary	(11%)	39%
International Working Youth Conference in Moscow	(2%)	13%
Indochina [Vietnam]	(13%)	5%
U.S. Elections	(12%)	4%]
China	(--)	3%
	(4%)	2%

Peking (1482 items)

Indochina	(52%)	33%
[Vietnam]	(38%)	14%]
[Cambodian National Day]	(--)	12%]
Domestic Issues	(25%)	30%
UNGA Session	(3%)	6%
Albanian Military Delegation in PRC	(--)	6%
Malagasy-PRC Diplomatic Relations	(1%)	6%
October Revolution Anniversary	(--)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi's 14 November announcement of Le Duc Tho's departure that day for Paris, where he would join Xuan Thuy in a private meeting proposed "recently" by the U.S. side, came against the background of persistent DRV complaints about the U.S. failure to sign the peace accord. While Hanoi has explicitly charged on at least one occasion that the United States was attempting to renege on the peace terms, the main thrust of the propaganda is that the text has been agreed to and should stand. Consistent with this pattern, the announcement of Tho's departure for Paris skirted the question of substantive changes when it said vaguely that the forthcoming meeting was to take care of the question of signing the agreement.

Hanoi media have continued generally to avoid discussion of specific issues in contention. However, following the 8 November NHAN DAN editorial which raised the question of the release of political prisoners, an editorial in the paper on the 10th observed that President Thieu wants the United States to continue the war and opposes the formation of a three-segment administrative structure in the South as well as unification of Vietnam.

Peking announced Le Duc Tho's arrival there on the 14th on his way to Paris. Tho had "a very cordial and friendly conversation" with Chou En-lai at a meeting also attended by VWP Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan, a figure long associated with Sino-Vietnamese and international communist relations. Since the airing of a spate of authoritative comment around the turn of the month pressing for prompt signing of the peace accord, Peking has been marking time on the question of a Vietnam settlement.

Brezhnev, in brief comments in a 13 November speech, went beyond earlier remarks by Kosygin and Mazurov when he blamed the "American side" for placing "obstacles" in the way of the peace agreement. Brezhnev also repeated a pro forma pledge of "active support" for the Vietnamese struggle but coupled it with an emphatic assertion that the USSR will "strive to facilitate the ending of the war." TASS promptly on the 14th carried Hanoi's announcement that Le Duc Tho had left for Paris and reported that the White House had confirmed that Kissinger would meet with Tho.

DRV AGREES TO PRIVATE MEETING, URGES SIGNING OF PEACE ACCORD

The announcement of Le Duc Tho's departure for Paris on the 14th was couched in language compatible with Hanoi's public position

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that the United States should promptly sign the agreed text of the peace accord. Thus, the announcement said that the U.S. side had proposed another private meeting "to solve the question of signing the agreement" (giai quyet viec ky ket hiep dinh). It suggested that the agreement should stand as is when it added that the Vietnamese are warmly responding to and the world's people are actively supporting the DRV's 26 October statement and are vigorously demanding that the United States "strictly abide by the terms agreed upon [giu dung nhung dieu da thoa thuan] and sign the agreement immediately." On the other hand, the announcement's concluding passage could be read as implying that there would be further negotiating. It warned that if the U.S. side continues to seek ways to prolong the negotiations and delay the signing and to carry on the war, the Vietnamese people are determined to pursue and step up the fight "until genuine independence, freedom, and peace are achieved."

While acknowledging that Kissinger and the President had said there were issues that needed to be discussed and settled before the agreement is signed, prior to the announcement that Le Duc Tho was en route to Paris Hanoi had generally avoided directly broaching the question of an actual resumption of the private talks. Thus, although Hanoi had briefly mentioned Xuan Thuy's 4 November interview with the New York TIMES' Flora Lewis, it did not acknowledge his reported assertion that the DRV was not creating any difficulties about a further meeting but that if after another final round of talks the United States agrees and then proposes more changes, it would be very difficult. Hanoi media similarly ignored Thuy's remarks on renewed private meetings in his 10 November AFP interview. This accords with Hanoi's long-standing propaganda practice of frequently failing to publicize in its official media issues which Vietnamese communist spokesmen have discussed with foreign journalists.

Also consistent with Hanoi's long-standing cursory treatment of the Paris plenary sessions, its accounts of the sessions in the three weeks since the 26 October release of the draft peace accord have totally ignored the GVN delegate's lengthy statements, which have raised such questions as the details of a cease-fire, the status of the demilitarized zone and continued presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South, and the question of political power in South Vietnam. Hanoi's concern to avoid substantive details and the issue of further negotiations was also illustrated by the fact that its domestic media ignored the 10-12 November trip of Kissinger's deputy, General Haig, to Saigon to see President Thieu. A Hanoi English-language

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broadcast did refer to Haig's arrival in passing, saying that it coincided with the delivery of more large shipments of U.S. military materiel to Saigon.

NHAN DAN EDITORIALS Hanoi's most noteworthy comment since its 26 October release of the summary of the peace agreement appeared in a series of four editorials in the party organ NHAN DAN from 8 through 11 November which raised sensitive substantive issues and sharply attacked Thieu. The timing suggests that Hanoi may have wanted to wait until after the U.S. election to engage in substantive discussion on an authoritative level. The absence of substantial, authoritative comment since the 11th may be related to the timing of Hanoi's decision regarding Le Duc Tho's return to Paris and another round of private talks with Kissinger.

The NHAN DAN editorial of 8 November, in attacking Thieu's stepped-up "political persecution," notably stressed that the peace agreement clearly provides for the release of political as well as military prisoners.* The editorial charged the United States with "deliberately delaying" the signing of the agreement and even attempting "to renege on the terms it agreed to." The editorial in the paper on the 9th complained of the U.S. dispatch of massive military supplies to Saigon, calling this and Thieu's "persecution policy" illegal acts. Instead of repeating the charge that the United States was going back on the agreement, that editorial suggested three possible reasons for accelerated U.S. military shipments to Thieu: 1) the United States wants not a political solution but a continuation of the war; 2) it wants to create better conditions for negotiating from a position of strength and for demanding changes in the agreed peace accord; or 3) it wants to strengthen Thieu militarily so that he can resist the PLAF and suppress those who approve of national concord.

* The editorial is discussed in the 8 November 1972 TRENDS, pages 1-3. As noted above, Hanoi media have not carried Xuan Thuy's 10 November AFP interview in which he reportedly said that Hanoi believes the two sides should free prisoners at the same time, but that to show its good will it had accepted the U.S. view that the foreign military and civilian prisoners will be freed within two months and the South Vietnamese civilians within three months "according to the dispositions agreed on between the two South Vietnamese parties."

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The NHAN DAN editorial of the 10th--entitled "The Obstacles to be Removed"--said that the first obstacle is the apparent U.S. intention to prolong the war through Vietnamization and that the second is "top traitor Thieu." Echoing the editorial of the 9th and earlier propaganda, it ridiculed the notion that the arms buildup was part of the preparations for a cease-fire. In this connection, it quoted Secretary Rogers as saying in his Meet the Press TV interview on the 5th that the sending of supplies to Thieu is an effort to assure Saigon that it would have the necessary weapons and other war materiel in case a peace agreement could not be realized.

In discussing the need for Thieu to be removed, the editorial broached some of his specific objections to the peace agreement. Without mentioning a cease-fire, it said that he opposes an end to U.S. military involvement--that is, that he wants the United States to continue the war in South Vietnam and to bomb and blockade North Vietnam. The editorial added that Thieu opposes national concord, and specifically the formation of a three-segment administrative structure in South Vietnam, and that he opposes "our compatriots' aspirations for national unification because he brazenly considers the southern and northern parts of our nation as two separate countries."

A 14 November Saigon broadcast on General Haig's visit indicated that the GVN continues to oppose the proposed three-segment administrative structure and would not be mollified by a change in the Vietnamese term used in this regard. Citing the views of "authoritative and most reliable Independence Palace sources," the broadcast charged that the North Vietnamese intend to impose a three-segment government ("chanh phu") described as an administrative ("hanh chanh") structure. The Vietnamese word used for "administrative" in Hanoi's 26 October summary of the agreement was "chinh quyen," a term which can also be used to mean "government." The term "hanh chanh" which the Saigon broadcast used is a less ambiguous term for administration and does not connote government or power. According to Western press reports, Kissinger in remarks to foreign newsmen on 4 November indicated that in the peace agreement the United States wishes to use the least vague of three Vietnamese terms to describe the administrative structure.*

The editorial on the 10th said that Thieu not only wanted to replace "many important articles" in the approved agreement with his "insolent demands" but even wanted "to pose the problem

* See the 1 November 1972 TRENDS, page 7, for a discussion of the various Vietnamese terms.

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concerning the negotiating procedures." The paper stopped short of explicitly mentioning Saigon's desire to participate in final negotiations and to sign the peace agreement. But it went on to declare that rather than "frenziedly" opposing the agreement, Thieu should realize that "he is lucky to survive" under the terms of the agreement. It concluded by posing the question whether the Nixon Administration wants to choose peace or to choose Thieu and thereby continue the Vietnamization plan.

The NHAN DAN editorial of the 11th pursued the issue of Thieu as an obstacle to an agreement, particularly noting opposition to him in circles from which the third segment of the proposed administrative structure presumably would be drawn. It observed that the forces which oppose Thieu at home and abroad are interested in solving South Vietnam's internal problems in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord. In the course of reiterating that the peace agreement takes into account the actual situation in the South--where there are two administrations, two armies, and three political forces--the editorial used language that differed from Hanoi's summary of the peace agreement in regard to elections. Point four of the summary had explained that the administrative structure, called the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord, "will be set up to promote the implementation of the signed agreements by the PRG and the Saigon government and to organize general elections." The editorial on the 11th said that the administrative structure would advance toward free and democratic elections "to elect the organs of power in the South," but it still left ambiguous whether the elections would be for executive or legislative organs or both. Past communist proposals have indicated that general elections meant elections for an assembly to work out a new constitution, while allied proposals have called for presidential elections.*

After an impassioned declaration on the need for Thieu to resign or be removed, the editorial of the 11th assumed a notably conciliatory tone: It said that "because of different social and individual circumstances, there can be different paths of opposing the Americans and Thieu. Although there remain some disagreements and misunderstandings, . . . all forces loving the country and freedom can discuss together how best to serve the

* See the TRENDS of 1 November 1972, page 8.

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Fatherland and the compatriots." A similar tack was taken in a Hanoi radio commentary on the 8th which denigrated Thieu and his career at length. It said that in the Saigon army there also are a number of high-ranking officers who, for one reason or another, have attained their present position by the same path as Thieu. "Nevertheless," it added, "the difference is that these persons do not call themselves leaders or politicians, and they do not show that they follow the Americans to the end or oppose by one way or another the nation to the end. They do accept national reconciliation and concord so that peace may be reestablished."

THE FRONT PRG media have continued to echo Hanoi's attacks on the United States for failing to sign the peace agreement, and Liberation Radio on the 10th began broadcasting speeches delivered at the 1-2 November conference of the NFLSV Central Committee Presidium and the Executive Committee of the Vietnam Alliance.* Liberation Radio reported that NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, in his opening speech, welcomed the draft agreement as a "sensible and reasonable solution consistent with the realities in South Vietnam." He declared that "if the U.S. Government clearly understands the situation and truly wants to end the war honorably, the solution for peace is available."

In line with the Hanoi comment cited above, Tho went on to score the United States for delaying the signing of the agreement by demanding changes and prolonging the negotiations and the war. Stressing the importance of national concord at this juncture, he called upon the Front and the Alliance to "strengthen their contacts and broaden their consultations with all forces, political and religious organizations, and individuals inside and outside the country, including those in the Saigon army and administration who want peace and national concord."

Other reports delivered at the conference and broadcast by Liberation Radio included a statement by PRG Defense Minister Tram Nam Trung in which he lauded the communist offensive and claimed that the expanded "liberated areas" have "formed firm and steady base areas and springboards for offensives" and have "provided sufficient human and material resources for developing the offensive posture in order to win total victory for the revolution."

* Initial reports on the conference are discussed in the 8 November 1972 TRENDS, pages 5-6.

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PEKING FETES LE DUC THO, MARKS TIME ON VIETNAM SETTLEMENT

Peking gave a standard welcome to Le Duc Tho during his 14-15 November stopover en route to Paris, reporting in stock terms that he had "a very cordial and friendly conversation" with Chou En-lai and Vice Premier Li Hsien-rieh and was honored at a banquet hosted by Li. There was no description of the atmosphere at the banquet nor any mention of speeches. This is consistent with the pattern followed at the time of Tho's four stopovers from June to September. However, during Tho's last visit on 15-16 October--after the peace accord had been negotiated--NCNA reported on the remarks made at the banquet, which was then hosted by Chou and occasioned toasts to growing Sino-Vietnamese unity.

Li greeted Tho at the airport on his arrival and saw him off on his way to Paris via Moscow. NCNA also noted the presence at the airport of Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov when Tho departed.

DRV OFFICIALS
IN PEKING

In addition to Tho's standard stopover, the presence of other DRV officials in Peking indicate that consultations have been underway on such subjects as Chinese aid to Vietnam and Peking's role in a settlement. Among those reported present during Tho's activities in Peking was North Vietnamese Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan, who NCNA disclosed is "now in Peking." Hoan, who led the DRV mission in Peking from 1950 to 1957, has long played a major role in international communist relations, and he apparently spent considerable time in China in late 1969 during the period of improving Sino-Vietnamese relations and the opening of Sino-Soviet talks in Peking. Hoan made a two-day layover in Peking in late May as he was returning from the funeral of the Mongolian president. There was no announcement on his arrival in Peking on the present visit; he last appeared in Hanoi on 3 September.

Peking announced on 15 November that a DRV economic delegation led by Politburo member and Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi arrived by plane that afternoon, hard on the heels of Tho's departure that morning. Earlier on the same day Hanoi reported the departure of the delegation for "a number of socialist countries" to negotiate agreements on "economic and military aid for 1973." The DRV's annual aid agreements with the communist countries have customarily been signed by such a touring delegation over the years, though last year's accords were atypically signed in Hanoi by delegations visiting from the donor countries.

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Preparations for the Nghi delegation's visit to the PRC had been made by DRV Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban, who arrived in Peking on 7 October as head of an "experts delegation" to "discuss" Chinese economic and military assistance for 1973. Ban had negotiated the supplementary aid agreement signed with the Chinese on 28 June in the course of a protracted stay in China.

VIETNAM SETTLEMENT Peking has reverted to a low posture on Vietnam after winding down its major campaign to pressure the United States to sign the draft agreement disclosed by Hanoi on 26 October. Reflecting what may have been Chinese concern to have a settlement firmed up before the U.S. Presidential election, Peking issued four authoritative pronouncements in the five days up to 3 November, but since that time there has been no significant Chinese comment. Recent Chinese leaders' speeches have virtually ignored Vietnam, the sole exception being a passing reference to the Indochinese conflict by Politburo alternate member Li Te-sheng during a 11 November rally for the visiting Albanian defense minister.

Peking's current coverage of Vietnam developments has had a time-marking quality, consisting largely of replays of Vietnamese and other foreign comment that has been carefully edited to sidestep sensitive issues concerning a settlement and to muffle criticism of the Nixon Administration and its intentions. Peking carried the text of Hanoi's announcement on Tho's return to Paris for further negotiations.

Typifying Peking's discreet approach, NCNA avoided any reference to the substance of the Vietnam draft agreement in reporting the 8 November NHAN DAN editorial that had marked Hanoi's first discussion of any of the details of the accord. NCNA duly repeated NHAN DAN's charges against the Thieu government's alleged persecution of prisoners in the South, but the account omitted those passages connecting a prisoner release with the announced agreement. NCNA also muted NHAN DAN's charge that the Thieu government's persecution of prisoners together with the recently increased tempo of U.S. deliveries of war materiel to South Vietnam were "threatening" the agreement.

Peking's divergence from its Vietnamese allies in dealing with the United States was pointed up by the NCNA account of a 10 November NHAN DAN editorial on obstacles to a peace agreement.

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NCNA omitted a charge of U.S. "treachery" in delaying the signing of the agreement as well as the claim that Washington actually welcomes the Thieu regime's opposition to the draft accord. Though the NCNA version cited NHAN DAN's criticism of recent remarks on Vietnam by Secretary Rogers, it deleted the editorial's other charges against the Nixon Administration by name. An NCNA replay of a 9 November PRG Foreign Min. try spokesman statement protesting U.S. arms shipments to South Vietnam omitted a paragraph that harshly criticized the President by name and also excised the spokesman's charge that the Nixon Administration is engaging in a "peace hoax." In addition, Peking's treatment of the NHAN DAN editorial on the 10th as well as one on the 9th concerning U.S. arms shipments was measurably more moderate concerning the Thieu government. NCNA deleted all but one of the 9 November editorial's references to the Thieu "puppet" regime, substituting the neutral term "Thieu administration," and it excised the demand in NHAN DAN on the 10th that Thieu be "eliminated" to insure successful enactment of the draft agreement.

BREZHNEV CALLS FOR REMOVAL OF OBSTACLES "CREATED BY U.S. SIDE"

Brezhnev's comments on Vietnam in his 13 November speech at the dinner for the visiting Bulgarian delegation conveyed a sense of urgency regarding the U.S.-DRV peace agreement. The Soviet leader asserted that the attention of world public opinion is "riveted" to the question of a Vietnam settlement and that the people of the world demand that "the obstacles created by the American side, literally on the eve of signing an agreement," be removed and the war ended "at the earliest time." Kosygin on 27 October had expressed hope that "continued talks" would lead to agreement "soon." And Mazurov on 6 November, noting that the agreement "was not signed on the date fixed," called for its signing "as soon as possible." Neither explicitly castigated the United States for the delay in signing as Brezhnev did on the 13th.

Brezhnev repeated a pro forma pledge of "active support" for the "just cause" of the Vietnamese fighting "U.S. aggression," but he coupled it with an emphatic assertion that the Soviet Union will "strive to facilitate the ending of the war and will welcome the restoration of peace in Indochina." When this happens, he concluded, "the world will sigh with relief and the international horizon on the whole clear up noticeably."

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The day before Brezhnev's speech, a RED STAR article by military observer Col. A. Leontyev speculated that U.S. procrastination may "jeopardize the agreement already reached" and "indefinitely prolong the war." This line had been broached as early as 2 November in an IZVESTIYA article by Matveyev, who warned that the "serious situation" created by the U.S. attitude on the peace accord "jeopardizes what has been achieved" and demanded that the United States not "prolong the bloodshed in Vietnam." Leontyev went beyond Matveyev, however, when he forcefully condemned the United States for making one more attempt to break the will of the Vietnamese people in order to then start "another round of 'exhausting talks' and try to wrest concessions in favor of the Saigon regime." Leontyev echoed other propaganda when he said the United States had delayed the signing to gain time for the dispatch of weapons and ammunition to the Saigon regime. He observed that this "can only place a mine under the still unsigned agreement." A foreign-language radio commentary on 13 November echoed Mayevskiy in the 2 November PRAVDA when it said that the Americans are delivering arms to Saigon because they intend to "preserve and consolidate the Saigon army's military potential for a guerrilla war if and when the American forces ever get out of South Vietnam."

TASS on 14 November reported Le Duc Tho's departure from Hanoi for Paris to attend a private meeting with the American side "with the object of settling the issue of signing an agreement to end the war." On the 12th TASS had briefly cited the New York TIMES for the speculation that Kissinger was to return to Paris to "resume talks about an agreement on ending the war." The same TASS item also cited a report in the French newspaper FRANCE-SOIR that the South Vietnamese authorities have no more objections to the terms of a cease-fire agreement. On the 14th TASS duly reported the White House announcement that Kissinger would meet with Le Duc Tho in Paris, adding that the White House press secretary also said the United States was satisfied with the course of the talks. Moscow media on the 13th reported briefly on General Haig's visits to Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Seoul, speculating that his talks concerned the U.S.-DRV agreement. A Moscow domestic service commentary on the 10th cited speculation that Haig's trip was designed to gain time to arm the Saigon regime as well as to "confirm" the U.S. argument that the U.S. delay in signing the accord has been due to Saigon's disagreement.

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HANOI ROUTINELY PROTESTS U.S. STRIKES IN NORTH VIETNAM

Routine daily statements by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman have continued to protest strikes by B-52's and other U.S. planes over the North, as well as shelling of coastal areas by U.S. warships. The statements claim in standard fashion that the United States is bombing civilian installations, citing several villages and state farms as well as a church as targets. Several statements have specifically charged that such actions give the lie to the United States' "allegations that it is ending its military involvement and that it longs for a fair and honorable peace for everyone." Hanoi claimed to have downed 10 more planes during the past week, including an F-111 on the 7th, for a total of 4,042, and to have set ablaze two U.S. warships.

Quoting from the spokesman's statements as well as from Western and Saigon press reports, a Hanoi radio commentary on 14 November condemned recently intensified U.S. air activity over both North and South Vietnam, and particularly the increase in B-52 "extermination bombings." The commentary charged that such an escalation, carried out in a frantic attempt to salvage the Vietnamization policy, only reveals the Nixon Administration's "warlike and barbarous nature" and, together with its "breach of faith" in not signing the peace agreement, exposes the reality behind alleged Administration efforts to deceive the world's people into believing peace is at hand. Claiming that the Vietnamese struggle enjoys undiminished world public support, the commentary expressed Vietnamese resolve to defeat the "U.S. aggressors" in both the North and South and cited as proof the achievements of the armed forces and people in the North in downing U.S. planes, including the B-52 "trump cards."

U.S. "war crimes" in the North during October were cited in a communique issued by the DRV War Crimes Commission on 6 November. Stressing that these actions were carried out while the United States was professing "good will" and "peace," the communique charged that they included "some 7,200 tactical plane sorties, some 710 B-52 sorties, and nearly 1,500 reconnaissance sorties." Making no distinction between actions in the last week of October--when the bombing halt north of the 20th parallel went into effect--and the rest of the month, the communique claimed that the raids had hit "22 provinces, six cities, 20 provincial capitals, and a very large number of populous townships, hamlets, and villages." The communique highlighted raids on Hanoi

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(including the 11 October raid which destroyed the French diplomatic mission), Haiphong, and Vinh, as well as on some of the provincial capitals. It claimed that the B-52 strikes--which it argued were mostly conducted at night in order to maximize civilian casualties--had hit areas from Nghe An to the Vinh Linh zone in 236 missions. In response to these attacks, the communique claimed that 67 U.S. planes were downed during October, including three B-52's, and that U.S. warships were set on fire 13 times.

Specific praise for the "compatriots and combatants" of the Fourth Military Region in the face of "the U.S. aggressors' current war of aggression" appeared in a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial of 13 November. Arguing that the region is regarded by the United States as "a key target for extremely savage and massive extermination bombardment," which it carries out "in hope of undermining our people's fighting determination and interdicting the flow of support and assistance from our rear base to the frontline," the editorial claimed that the armed forces and people have nevertheless managed to maintain uninterrupted communications, to fight well, and to continue production. It stressed that they will continue to carry out their "fraternal" and "internationalist" duties against the "U.S. aggressors," and it closed with a pledge to continue the struggle in the spirit of "President Ho's sacred testament and . . . the appeal contained in our government's 26 October statement" on the peace accord until the United States is totally defeated.

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U. S. ELECTIONS

SOVIET BLOC VIEWS ELECTION RETURNS AS MANDATE FOR DETENTE

President Nixon's landslide re-election was generally welcomed in Moscow and in East European capitals as a vote for international detente. Accompanying the official messages of congratulations that noted with satisfaction the recent improvement in East-West relations, press and radio commentaries saw the landslide as offering broad prospects for further relaxation of international tensions. Consistent with the pre-election comment, the post-mortems on the election attributed the President's overwhelming victory largely to the favorable impact on American voters of the Administration's moves toward improved relations with the Soviet Union and other communist countries. Speaking in this vein at a Kremlin reception on the 13th for visiting Bulgarian leader Zhivkov, Brezhnev credited the recent improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations with having changed the tenor of the U.S. election campaign from the rhetoric of "a quarter century of cold war" to "appeals for a peace-loving, realistic foreign policy."

MOSCOW COMMENT Setting the pattern for Soviet commentaries, a TASS dispatch by Igor Orlov, broadcast by Moscow radio in English on the 8th, stated that certain changes in U.S. foreign policy "linked with the relaxation of international tension" had played a "big part" in the Nixon landslide. "The President put to his credit, specifically," Orlov explained, "the improvement of Soviet-American relations which found expression in a number of important agreements between the USSR and the United States which promote the general strengthening of international security."

Another major factor influencing the American voter, Orlov maintained, was the emergence of the outlines of a Vietnam settlement on the eve of the election. While noting that Washington had failed to sign the Paris accord, Orlov declared that its very existence had influenced the voters, who "believed that the U.S. Government would fulfil the commitments undertaken and would sign the agreement, as H. Kissinger asserted, at the earliest time." By contrast, Senator McGovern's inability to exploit the Vietnam issue was explained on grounds that he "could offer the electors only statements which, in the course of the election campaign, were only modified."

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While giving foreign policy issues major credit for the outcome of the presidential race, Orlov contended that the congressional races were decided on domestic issues and by the stress placed on them by Democratic party candidates. This, he said, was why the Republican party had failed to gain majorities in the House and Senate.

The treatment of the election results as a mandate for peace became a staple of subsequent Soviet commentaries. A 10 November PRAVDA dispatch from Washington typically observed that "the election has shown that the vast majority of the electorate--irrespective of whether it voted for the Republicans or Democrats--advocates a relaxation of international tension and cooperation between states with different social systems." Calling the state of U.S.-Soviet relations an "essential barometer" by which Americans judge their government's policies, an IZVESTIYA article on the 10th by V. Matveyev stressed the beneficial impact of the Moscow summit on the election: "For the first time in the whole postwar period a candidate for the U.S. presidency, striving for re-election, has been able to present voters not with one but with a number of important Soviet-American agreements on limiting strategic arms, trade, protection of the environment, and other questions." Matveyev went on to urge the Administration "not to betray these hopes and aspirations of ordinary Americans for a direction of the efforts of the country and nation toward peaceful, creative aims both in the international arena and in the United States itself, including the speediest end to the war in Vietnam."

While focusing mainly on the positive foreign policy aspects of the election, Soviet comment also took note of negative domestic features. Such phenomena as voter apathy, the costs of campaigning, and the role of "monopoly capital" were singled out as typical features of the U.S. political process. A PRAVDA commentary on the 10th, for example, dismissed the differences between the major parties in standard, traditional terms, charging that both parties sought mainly "to convince the electorate that it 'has the opportunity to choose' when in fact real power remains in the hands of the powerful of this world."

EAST EUROPEAN COMMENT The movement toward detente in foreign policy was similarly emphasized as the telling factor in the election by Moscow's East European allies. The Warsaw daily GLOS PRACY, for example, commented on the 10th that the Nixon landslide stemmed largely from the opening of a "meaningful dialog" between Washington and the communist countries,

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and it expressed hope that the massive vote of confidence in the President would lead to further development of the "constructive" elements in U.S. foreign policy. Romanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian commentaries viewed the election in much the same terms, with the Romanians using the occasion to draw attention to the "ascending evolution" of relations between Washington and Bucharest and to stress again the importance of good relations among "all" socialist countries and "all" states irrespective of social systems.

The progress toward a settlement of the Vietnam war was also seen in Bulgarian, Hungarian, Czechoslovak, and Romanian commentaries as a major factor influencing the outcome of the election. A 9 November commentary in Prague's RUDE PRAVO bluntly asserted that "it became one of the main causes of McGovern's defeat when President Nixon pulled the rug from under his feet by the latest negotiations of Henry Kissinger and the promises of ending the war." This sentiment was echoed in a commentary on the 9th in Sofia's ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME, which went on to interpret the election results as a "mandate" for immediate cessation of the Vietnam war on the basis of the draft U.S.-DRV agreement.

Some assessments of the election by hardline elements in East Europe were characteristically more blunt and less charitable toward the United States. An 8 November commentary in Prague's MLADA FRONTA, for example, accused the President of demagoguery, arguing that he had deviously manipulated the "certain detente" in international relations "in a masterly way" and had "prevented peace in Indochina to this very day." It likewise described the average American as "a conservative who is afraid of new things and of unrest and who prefers slight progress to any and all radicalism." An 8 November commentary on the East Berlin domestic service also belabored the phenomenon of voter apathy and other alleged deficiencies in the U.S. electoral system.

YUGOSLAV COMMENTATORS EXHIBIT CAUTION ON POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Belgrade comment on the U.S. election outcome was cautious and circumspect on its policy implications. An 8 November domestic service commentary on Belgrade radio displayed anxiety about the prospects for peace when it expressed hope that events would disprove the judgments of President Nixon's critics who "darkly predict that the President, who cannot be elected for a third time, and who at heart has always been a rightist and conservative, will now finally show his true face and drop the mask of a peacemaker."

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Taking a more balanced stance in POLITIKA on the 9th, Dusan Simic saw the election as a vote for "stability and certainty" in U.S. foreign policy instead of for the "attractive uncertainties offered by George McGovern." Simic saw the favorable reaction to the Nixon landslide "in the big world centers" as evidence of the extent to which the President had "progressed, within a relatively short time, from his former reputation of an exemplary cold war fighter to the status of a statesman sufficiently acceptable not only to American voters but also to a majority of external factors on which world peace and the position of the United States as a world power depend." After noting the Administration's major foreign policy successes--in achieving a "more peaceful and stable" world "without sacrificing any U.S. vital interests"--and praising the President for "extraordinary skill" in dealing with former adversaries in the world arena, Simic observed that "even more skill" would be required in the future "for turning promises into action and announcements into facts."

PEKING PROVIDES STRAIGHTFORWARD REPORT ON ELECTION RESULTS

Peking provided a single, purely factual report on the election results, an NCNA report on 8 November noting the popular and electoral vote totals and explaining the presidential electoral system. There was no mention of races other than the presidential one. Peking's only other discussion of the election, a 24 August NCNA account of the Democratic and Republican conventions, had contained some polemical elements in referring to the two major "bourgeois" parties and mentioning antiwar demonstrations during both conventions. Other Chinese coverage prior to the election consisted of replays of foreign--mainly North Vietnamese--comment on the President's statements on Vietnam. Typifying Peking's restraint, an NCNA account on 3 November of the President's speech the previous day failed to mention that it was an election address.

Peking's straightforward, noncommittal report on the election is consistent with the new atmosphere surrounding Sino-U.S. relations and the continuing Chinese restraint in discussing U.S. internal affairs. Implicit in Peking's approach has been a recognition that the PRC must deal with the powers that be in Washington, and the election totals told their own story in this context. In contrast to the noncommittal approach this time, Peking had reacted in polemical terms to the 1968 presidential election as "an out-and-out diabolic fraud of the monopoly capitalist class to fool the

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American people." At the same time, however, Peking had signaled its interest in probing possibilities of a reorientation of U.S. foreign policy under the new President which would reduce the area of Sino-U.S. conflict. Thus, in Peking's sole comment on the President-elect's campaign statements, NCNA said he was elected after calling for a reduction of commitments in areas where the United States was overextended and emphasis on priority areas such as Europe. Later in November 1968 Peking reinforced that signal by issuing an official statement that expressed readiness to resume the Warsaw talks with representatives of the incoming Administration in order to seek agreement on the five principles of peaceful coexistence--the principles eventually incorporated into the Shanghai communique on President Nixon's visit to China this February.

SINGLE CUBAN COMMENTARY DISPARAGES U.S. "ELECTORAL FARCE"

The sole monitored Cuban commentary on the election outcome, in an 8 November Havana broadcast to Latin America, emphasized the "contradiction" inherent in the President's re-election while his party lost out in its effort to gain control of Congress. This revealed, the commentary said, "the nature of the U.S. electoral farce." The commentary fell back on the stock communist portrayal of the two major American political parties as indistinguishable "tools of the oligarchy" whose candidates run on identical platforms offering the voters no real choice. Election outcomes, in this portrayal, are determined by "propaganda, the electoral machinery, and the candidates' promises."

Not even this kind of potboiler was broadcast in the Cuban domestic service. Nor has any judgment been rendered so far by the leading Cuban commentators who speak on Havana television and set the line for substantive Cuban reactions to major developments, or by the freewheeling Guido Garcia Inclan who tends to reflect Fidel Castro's personal views.

In contrast to the hackneyed post-election broadcast dismissing the results of any U.S. election as meaningless and thus in effect abstaining from comment, Castro on 26 July had publicly asserted his view of the Democratic Party as the lesser of evils and noted approvingly that "one of the candidates" for the presidency was said to favor lifting of the economic "blockade" of Cuba; Castro described the Republican Party as having "the worst position and . . . the most criminal, the most reactionary, and the most warmongering."

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Cuban commentators said little about the election campaign while it was in progress until the final week, when a rash of comment accused the President of exploiting aspirations for an end to the Vietnam war for crass political purposes, picturing a settlement as imminent and then reneging by failing to meet Hanoi's 31 October "deadline" for signing.

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GERMANY

BREZHNEV WARMLY PRAISES BONN BUT NOTES LIMITS ON COOPERATION

Brezhnev used his 13 November speech at the Kremlin dinner for visiting Bulgarian leader Zhivkov to warmly welcome the "ascending line" of developing relations between the USSR and the FRG, crediting it to the establishment of "mutual trust" between the two countries on the basis of Bonn's adoption of a "realistic" policy toward present-day Europe. At the same time, speaking five days after the initialing of the FRG-GDR basic treaty in Bonn, he seconded the East German insistence on a definitive recognition of the ideological dividing line between West Germany and the Soviet bloc.

Serving in part as support for Moscow's East German ally, Brezhnev's stress on the "absolute" ideological gulf between Moscow and Bonn also seemed directed in part at the West German electorate, which will vote for a new parliament on 19 November. His remarks seemed calculated to undercut charges by the opposition CDU/CSU parties that the ruling Social Democrats have moved too far to the left in cooperating with the communists and have given too much away in negotiating the Ostpolitik treaties. While clearly acknowledging Moscow's hopes for the election outcome by lauding the policies of Chancellor Brandt's SPD/FDP coalition, Brezhnev expressed in strong terms the basic stand applied by the GDR to relations between the two German states: "We have no cooperation with the West German Social Democrats on questions of ideology," Brezhnev said, "nor can there be such cooperation. Everyone knows that ideologically we stand on absolutely different platforms."

CARROT AND STICK Without naming the CDU/CSU, Brezhnev denounced those forces, "still extant and very active in West Germany today," which "cannot stomach a relaxation and the consolidation of European peace." After listing the various Ostpolitik agreements reached by Bonn as constituting "a victory for all of Europe," Brezhnev went on, again with an eye to the West German electorate, to bestow unusually warm praise on the Brandt-Scheel government: "As for the FRG, objective people cannot but see that it is precisely now, when it has taken the path of a more realistic policy, its voice is heeded with greater attention everywhere in the world."

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Where Brezhnev held out to the West Germans the promise of greater international prestige deriving from pursuit of the Ostpolitik, East German propaganda leveled what amounted to a blunt warning that the fate of the detente between West Germany and the Soviet bloc hinged on a victory for Brandt's coalition. An ADN commentary on the 8th, entitled "There Is No Better Treaty," informed Opposition leaders Barzel and Strauss that "they would be very much mistaken if they believed that in the event of a CDU/CSU takeover of the government they could conclude a 'better' treaty with the GDR." Citing "circles" of the SED Politburo and the GDR Council of Ministers as its sources, the commentary declared that in initialing the treaty with the FRG, the GDR had acted on the premise that the present coalition would be in a position after the FRG elections "to continue the policy of establishing peaceful, businesslike relations with the Eastern countries"

PEKING ON TREATY The Peking NCNA's international service on 13 November carried a brief, straightforward report noting that the FRG and GDR had initialled their basic treaty on the 8th and that it would be signed after the 19 November elections and then ratified by the two German states. The NCNA account pointedly included a paragraph on the conclusion of two weeks of negotiations by the Big Four ambassadors on the 5th and the four powers' 9 November declaration "affirming that their 'rights and responsibilities' for Germany will be maintained."

Neither East Berlin nor Moscow has reacted to the speech by PRC Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, at an 11 October Peking banquet for visiting FRG Foreign Minister Scheel, in which he described the relationship between the two German states as "an abnormal situation." Chi said the Chinese "have always held that a fair and reasonable solution to the German question should be sought on the basis of respecting the interests and desires of the people of the two German states," stopping short of any reference to the role of the Big Four. He recalled that "as early as 1955" Mao had issued a proclamation ending the state of war with "Germany."

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

BREZHNEV MINICULT CONTINUES IN FACE OF POLICY SETBACKS

The steady if not overly conspicuous growth of the Brezhnev minicult in familiar and unfamiliar places suggests that Brezhnev has suffered no loss of influence as a result of this year's agricultural difficulties and the setback in the Middle East. In addition to continuing references to his wartime accomplishments, Brezhnev has recently won praise for inspiring and organizing the successful virgin land harvest and for keeping the populace supplied with food despite the drought--with no public mention of the purchase of foreign grain, however. At the same time, he has been honored by the publication of the third volume of his speeches and of a new collection of his foreign policy addresses. A lengthy review of the third Brezhnev volume appeared in PRAVDA on 1 November, and it was later reprinted in the regional papers.

Brezhnev's visit to the virgin lands in late August and early September--well-publicized in the press, films, and television--has been applauded by numerous virgin land officials for its inspirational effects. On 14 October, the day the Kazakh harvest successes were announced in KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, the Kazakh leaders praised the Central Committee and Brezhnev "personally" for their "constant concern" about Kazakh agriculture, and a PRAVDA article by Kazakh First Secretary Kunayev praised the instructions and advice given by Brezhnev during his visit.

Likewise, when the Altay successes were announced on 21 October, Altay leaders praised Brezhnev's advice and instructions in articles in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, SOVIET RUSSIA, RURAL LIFE and KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. Altay First Secretary A.V. Georgiyev was especially solicitous, lauding Brezhnev's "brilliant" Altay speech and "splendid knowledge" of industry and agriculture in the 13 September SOVIET RUSSIA and his "deep knowledge" of local affairs in the 21 October PRAVDA. According to the 25 October LITERARY GAZETTE, Georgiyev also attributed to Brezhnev "the strategy and tactics for the harvest" and the accelerated deliveries of agricultural equipment to the Altay harvesters.

Articles designed to convince the public of the adequacy of the food supply have also given Brezhnev much of the credit. A 23 September TRUD article disclosed that Brezhnev had said in

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his 31 August Novosibirsk speech that "everything the Politburo is doing this year is aimed, in the final analysis, at ensuring that the rhythm of life and the level of supply of the population of our country will not be worse but better than last year." SOVIET RUSSIA on 2 November published a kolkhoznik's letter addressed personally to Brezhnev lauding the regime's agricultural policies for successfully supplying the country despite the disastrous weather. The letter noted that even though the drought was worse than that of 1921, which caused widespread famine, this year "our kolkhozniks are living their normal life" and are "fully supplied" with grain and vegetables, "thanks to the concern of the party and government for the people's welfare." The letter was reprinted in other central and local papers and was even cited by Mazurov in his 6 November October Revolution anniversary address.

Brezhnev also received credit for the urban food supply from Leningrad First Secretary G.V. Romanov. In a local speech published in the 25 October LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, Romanov declared that the Central Committee, the Politburo, and Brezhnev "personally" were "doing everything necessary to supply the Soviet people with enough of all food products and consumer goods" and that the Central Committee and Brezhnev "personally" were taking "a constant interest in how Leningraders are being supplied with food products," with the result that "a quite wide selection of milk and meat products" was available in Leningrad stores.

JOURNAL REVEALS PURGE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE

In the wake of the replacement of liberal A.M. Rumyantsev as director of the Institute for Concrete Social Research, its parent body, the USSR Academy of Sciences Presidium, has sharply criticized the institute's work, ordered a reorganization, and redefined its tasks in more orthodox terms.* These disclosures were made in a report on a recent presidium meeting published in the October issue of the HERALD OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. Although the date was not given, the meeting apparently occurred shortly after the identification of conservative M.N. Rutkevich as institute director in the 16 May PRAVDA, since the October HERALD was already set in type on 19 August.

* For background see the TRENDS of 24 May 1972, pages 38-40.

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During Rumyantsev's tenure as director from 1968 to 1971, more orthodox social scientists, including Rutkevich, repeatedly warned against attempts to separate concrete social research from historical materialism and against the copying of bourgeois sociology. The decree adopted by the recent presidium session defined the institute's "main tasks" as analysis--"on the basis of dialectical and historical materialism" and the "theory of scientific communism"--of social relationships, social structure, and social planning, improvement of the management of social processes, cultural construction, and communist education of the workers, and criticism of bourgeois sociological theories.

The presidium complained that "many" of the institute's workers were "carried away by study of questions not within the competence" of the institute and that "its leadership did not take the necessary steps to ensure the high ideological-theoretical level of all publications." It criticized the institute's structure, operations, and personnel policies and decreed a "number of organizational measures" to eliminate the shortcomings. The institute was renamed the "Institute of Sociological Research."

Another institute in a politically sensitive field was also recently censured for ideological errors. The August QUESTIONS OF HISTORY published a decree of the History Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences attacking the Institute of History of the USSR for publishing works misinterpreting the 1917 revolution. Most harshly assailed were the writings of the institute's director P.V. Volobuyev, who "mistakenly" asserted that after the February 1917 revolution the proletariat was not prepared to be the leader of a new revolution--despite Lenin's assertions to the contrary. The decree declared that "bourgeois ideologists strive in every way to play down the role of the working class as the predominant force in the revolution" and use such views in the ideological struggle. Despite criticism of the books at a March 1972 meeting at the institute, workers of the institute attempted not only to defend the authors of the mistaken works "but even to depict them as 'innovators' and expressers of a 'new,' 'progressive' trend in science." The decree ordered "a strengthening of the leadership" of the institute's sector dealing with the tsarist period.

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CHINA

CAMPAIGN FOR A QUALITY EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM GAINS MOMENTUM

Peking has taken several steps to speed the reconstruction of its once decimated educational system by encouraging further relaxation of politically charged reforms undertaken during the cultural revolution. Recent commentaries have used notably frank language to put officials connected with the educational system on notice that while the ideal graduate is still one who is both "Red" and expert, emphasis is definitely to be placed on the latter. Chengtu radio on 11 November, for example, castigated "swindlers from the left" who emerged during the cultural revolution and tampered with Mao's educational line by "shouting that politics could squeeze out everything," creating a situation in which teachers and students were afraid to "talk about teaching or persist in rational systems of teaching." These same "swindlers" were specifically condemned for holding that "if politics and ideology are good, professional work is bound to be good" in an attempt to "corrupt the young people" and turn them into "political parrots who could only come out with political slogans but lacked actual knowledge."

A similar denigration of cultural revolution attempts to insure the political reliability of students as they passed through the educational system was contained in an article on training revolutionary successors broadcast by Radio Peking on 17 October which lashed out at "swindlers" for using "ultraleftist words" in an attempt to "make a fool of the broad masses of cadres, youths, and people" and turn them into "blind, muddleheaded revolutionaries." A radio Peking broadcast on the previous day attacked those who "peddled such trash as 'it is no use to study'...in a vain attempt to turn the youths into political imbeciles who cannot work, plow the fields, or fight a war."

Peking's current concern for quality education appears motivated in part by a need to overcome the problem of youthful workers who cannot do a satisfactory job on the production line because they have failed to "master techniques." This problem was candidly discussed in an article in RED FLAG No. 10, broadcast by Radio Peking on 20 October, which was critical of young factory workers who "have onesidedly set the study of politics against that of techniques." Spelling out some of the problems produced by young workers with inadequate technical knowledge, RED FLAG complained that some manufactured products are "junk" and that

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industrial accidents have resulted from the improper use of factory equipment. To overcome these shortcomings, young workers were firmly urged not to be "content with half-baked knowledge" and reminded that "to inherit skills from veteran workers, it is necessary to go through tempering and serious study." Driving the lesson home, RED FLAG argued that "since techniques are a science, and since science is true knowledge, one cannot master it without painstaking efforts."

Judging by a 9 November Changchun commentary written by the party branch of a local "7 May" school, calls for improving the quality of education have won enthusiastic response from local teachers. To deepen this initial enthusiasm, however, efforts are underway to help teachers distinguish more clearly between correct and erroneous educational lines. Indicating that some study of classical literature now falls within the correct line, the article revealed that Changchun educators are now teaching once forbidden writings by Mencius as part of the drive to strengthen the teaching of basic knowledge. Local students were said to be able to make an "oral and written translation of a chapter of classical literature," and it was claimed that those students who had been "influenced by the anarchist trend of thought" have overcome their ideological shortcomings.

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